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Abstract 
Standard innovation surveys do not consider incoming spillovers for non-innovative firms. The Swiss innovation 
surveys presented here measure the importance of competitors’ knowledge for both innovating and non-
innovating firms. This original feature not only enables us to accurately identify the role of incoming knowledge 
on R&D decisions and innovation output, but also to compare resulting data with those which standard 
innovation questionnaires provide. Using a panel data over four periods, we show that knowledge from rivals 
actually deters manufacturing firms from engaging in R&D activities. Moreover, we provide stronger evidence 
that intra-industry spillovers are more detrimental to innovation than that generally provided by data from 
standard surveys. The results suggest that the dominance of the absorptive capacity effect is more important to 
firms investing in R&D and that non-innovative firms rely more heavily than expected on their competitors to 
maintain their technological capacities.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Ever since the seminal article by Arrow (1962), many theoretical models using a symmetric 
view of knowledge spillovers (e.g. Spence 1984) have advocated that R&D efforts decrease 
with knowledge spillovers. A symmetric view of spillovers is usually implemented where no 
technological hierarchy among firms is supposed: in this case, outgoing knowledge spillovers 
dissuade a firm from investing in R&D (disincentive effect) whereas incoming knowledge 
spillovers encourage firms to reduce their own production of knowledge by free-riding other 
firms (efficiency effect). When an asymmetric view of knowledge spillovers among competitors 
is adopted, “technological leaders have less to learn from others than followers do” (Eeckout 
and Jovanovitch 2002). An increase in knowledge spillovers from leaders to followers tends to 
have the usual discouraging effect on competing leaders but also induces a decrease in 
followers’ R&D investment when one-way outgoing spillovers from leaders to followers are 
high and spillovers among competing leaders are low (Vandekerckhove and De Bondt 2008). In 
such a framework, it is interesting to note that lagging firms can choose to be pure imitators 
(See also Nelson and Winter 1982).  
 
This disincentive effect was seriously challenged by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), when they 
suggested that R&D investment can be seen as a strategic complement instead of a strategic 
substitute for firms: the deterring effect arising from knowledge spillovers may be dominated by 
the R&D efforts required to build an absorptive capacity, consequently enabling firms to capture 
external knowledge, including rivals’ knowledge. This persuasive argument is also in line with 
certain econometric studies which reported that firms benefiting from external knowledge were 
the same ones investing most in R&D (Jaffe, 1986; Levin, 1988). However, the importance of 
absorptive capacity over the disincentive effect for intra-industry spillovers has not been 
seriously tested. Despite the lack of empirical evidence regarding this issue, there is a 
widespread and persistent conviction that learning costs are dominant while disincentive effects 
are not very important. This viewpoint has been maintained by many recent empirical works 
based on innovation surveys (e.g. Community innovation surveys, CIS hereafter) where 
incoming knowledge is directly assessed through Likert scales.  
 
The present paper proposes to focus on the lack of attention given to the disincentive effect in 
empirical literature based on innovation questionnaires. The fact that standard innovation 
questionnaires assess incoming knowledge (in particular, knowledge coming from rivals) only 
for “innovative” firms has important consequences for the ability to identify their effects on 
R&D or innovation outputs. Employing a sub-sample restricted to innovative firms, using 
censored regressors and the introduction of a selection equation are some of the answers which 
have been proposed by scholars to correct this problem. We argue however that these solutions, 
implemented in order to cope with selectivity, not only fail to provide accurate identification of 
spillover parameters but also fail to unveil the strength of the disincentive effect of rivals’ ideas 
on innovative inputs and outputs.  
 
In order to test this proposal, we use the Swiss innovation panel data (KOF - ETH Zürich) 
composed of 1,744 manufacturing firms over four periods (1993-1995, 1996-1998, 1999-2001, 
2002-2003) or 2,653 firm-years to measure not only the importance of incoming external 
knowledge for innovators (as many innovation surveys do) but also that for non-innovators. 
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First, all data are implemented using a structural model similar to that used by Crépon et al. 
(1989), thereby facilitating the exploration of the “real” impact of rivals’ knowledge, either on 
R&D decisions or on innovative output. We then assess the different solutions proposed by 
scholars, restricting our use of Swiss data to that which a standard CIS questionnaire would 
generally offer.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the empirical 
literature on the impact of knowledge spillovers from rivals on R&D and innovation. Section 3 
describes the data collected and section 4 presents the econometric methodology. Results are 
presented in the next section. The final section deals with our conclusions. 
 
 
2 Empirical background 
 
The literature provides three different implemented methods regarding the identification of the 
disincentive effect of competitors’ incoming knowledge on R&D or innovation. In the first 
method, scholars try to identify, directly through questionnaires, those firms which are imitators 
or laggards. The asymmetric view of spillovers employs the idea that laggards benefit more 
from leaders and thus need to invest less in R&D. Using this concept, Link and Neufeld (1986) 
confirmed that imitators are less R&D intensive than innovators.  
 
The second method does not introduce any differences between firms, considering that each 
firm supplies all its rivals with knowledge through outgoing spillovers and that the latter supply 
the former in a reciprocal fashion. In this framework, an external pool of knowledge is 
computed, in order to assess if there is a negative impact of the potential incoming knowledge 
spillovers on R&D investment. Bernstein and Nadiri (1989) found a disincentive effect. The 
robustness of this result has however been challenged by several papers: Boone et al. (2007) 
suggest for example that the disincentive effect of competitors’ R&D is not robust when 
strategic externalities are controlled for. Jaffe (1986) reports that the R&D pool positively 
affects the number of patents filed but also that R&D intensity and the intra-industry R&D pool 
are complementary. 
 
The third method stems from the emergence in the 1980s of a qualitative and direct 
measurement of the role of incoming knowledge in the innovation process (see Levin et al., 
1987; OECD, 1992). Adopted by different innovation surveys1 ever since 1992, in this approach 
the question asked on incoming knowledge is for example: “Please indicate the sources of 
knowledge or information used in your technological innovation activities, and their importance 
during the period 1998-2000” (from UK CIS3), where answers are given for each type of 
external source (parent firms, customers, suppliers, competitors, universities, consultants) and 
are ranked according to their degree of importance (Not used, Low, Medium, High). In these 
standardized CIS questionnaires, incoming spillover variables are observed only for the sub-set 
of innovative firms. Yet, incoming knowledge is also important for non-innovating firms in 
order to maintain their technological capacities. Technological capacities of non-innovative 
firms may be not high enough to generate genuine innovation or significant improvements in 
processes or products but are still very important in maintaining high performance within a firm 
which uses almost the same processes and products (learning curves) or which may want to 
keep the opportunity to innovate in the future open (option value) (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994).  
 
                                                     
1 Community innovation surveys and also numerous innovation surveys carried out in developing countries based 
sometime on the “Bogota Manual” (See Raffo et al., 2008 for main references).  
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A selection problem therefore exists in the direct measurement of incoming spillovers and three 
different solutions to this question can be found in the academic literature. The first, which is 
also the most popular among scholars, proposes reducing the analysis to the sub-sample of 
innovative firms. In this setting, Crespi et al., (2007), show that knowledge coming from 
competitors does not influence the number of patents declared by U.K. innovating firms. 
Similarly, Belderbos et al. (2004) report that incoming competitors’ ideas do not influence the 
evolution of innovative sales per employee. In contrast to this however, when innovation inputs 
are considered, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) show on a restricted sample of Belgium firms 
that rivals’ ideas induce firms to invest less in R&D, subcontract it to a greater extent or buy it 
all outright.  
 
The second solution, initiated by Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse (1989) analyses R&D decisions 
and innovation determinants on the whole sample of firms, including non-innovators. In this 
case, variables on incoming knowledge need to be censored in order to be introduced in R&D or 
innovation output equations (Lööf and Heshmati, 2002; Griffith et al. 2006; Raffo et al., 2008). 
The different authors assume that non-innovating firms do not benefit from external sources of 
technological knowledge and consequently incoming knowledge is forced to the minimum 
value of the Likert scale (i.e. it is not important). Along these lines, Griffith et al. (2006) found 
there is a positive impact of spillovers from rivals on the likelihood of being a product or 
process innovator for firms in France and Spain, whereas non-significant coefficients are found 
for firms Germany and the United Kingdom. The heterogeneity of these results is confirmed by 
Raffo et al. (2008) who find a positive coefficient for Swiss firms in terms of process innovation 
but a non-significant relationship for French firms. Regarding the R&D intensity equation, 
Raffo et al. (2008) do not find any significant effect of rivals’ knowledge for Swiss firms but 
instead report a positive one for France firms, suggesting a dominant absorption capacity effect 
over the disincentive effect2. 
 
The third solution to the selectivity problem is, of course, to introduce a selection equation in 
order to correct the previous method for possible selection bias. In this way, the innovation 
output equation is still restricted to the sub-sample of innovative firms but takes the problem of 
sample selectivity into account (Lööf and Heshmati, 2002). Using censored regressors and 
correcting for selectivity, Lööf and Heshmati (2002) also find a positive effect of competitors’ 
knowledge on innovative sales, both in terms of level and growth-rate. 
 
All three methods are laudable efforts to overcome the selectivity problem regarding incoming 
knowledge variables. We contend however that they do not provide accurate identification of 
the role of rivals’ ideas, either in terms of innovation input or innovation output. The likelihood 
of innovating or not, and the decision to invest in R&D or not are both influenced by incoming 
spillovers influencing all firms, including non-innovative ones. To restrict the analysis to 
innovative firms is to neglect potential selection biases. The introduction of a selection equation 
may not properly correct for these biases since incoming knowledge certainly influences the 
selection process. The use of censored regressors, as carried out by Griffith et al. (2006) is an 
interesting solution but may induce upward biases (Rigobon and Stoker 2007).  
 
The next sections assess the role of incoming spillovers, especially from competitors, on R&D 
decisions and innovation outcomes by implementing uncensored data. First, the real impact of 
incoming spillovers is evaluated. The results from this are then used as a benchmark in order to 
compare the results that would be obtained with data coming from a standard innovation 
questionnaire. 
                                                     
2 The external sources are successfully introduced into the R&D intensity equation by Griffith et al. (2006) but the 
coefficients are not reported by the authors. 
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3 Data and variables 
 
The data used in this study comes from the 1996, 1999, 2002 and 2005 Swiss innovation 
surveys administrated by the KOF. The four waves of the Swiss questionnaire are similar to the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) questionnaire examining the nature and impact of 
innovation in the business sector at the European Union level and draws extensively on the Oslo 
manual’s guidelines (OECD, 1992). The data include measures of innovation-related 
expenditure, factors which have either encouraged or hampered innovation, including property 
rights, and the innovation outcome.  
 
As already suggested, the KOF questionnaires (1996, 1998, 2002, 2005) depart from other 
standard innovation questionnaires (e.g. from CIS1 to CIS4), exploring the source of external 
technological information and knowledge for innovative and non-innovative firms. The Swiss 
questionnaire uses the same method to directly measure incoming knowledge but is more 
general, asking the question «What is the importance of external sources of knowledge external 
to your firm for your own capacity of innovation” and rating the replies on a five-point Likert 
item. Non-innovating firms are thus asked to answer the question following the assumption that 
such firms have in fact their own “capacity of innovation”, something which is not taken into 
account in standard questionnaires.  
 
Beyond the incoming knowledge per type of external source (BUSINESS GROUP, SUPPLIER, 
COMPETITOR, CUSTOMER, UNIVERSITY, CONSULTANT), the other variables available 
are very similar to those of the CIS, as reported in Table 1. The Swiss innovation panel data 
covers innovation inputs (R&DYES, R&DI, R&D COOP), efficiency of appropriation strategies 
(APPROPRIATION), and innovation output (PRODUCT, PROCESS). As Table 1 also reports, 
the Swiss questionnaire includes additional general questions providing control variables (size, 
industry, price and non-price competition, perceived number of competitors, technology 
potential and demand anticipated). Note that the perceived number of competitors is an original 
variable and enables capturing data on potential or foreign competitors. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The Swiss innovation panel is a collection of four innovation surveys among Swiss firms for the 
years 1996, 1999, 2002 and 2005. These surveys were based on stratified random samples of 
firms with at least 5 employees covering all manufacturing industries and some services (see 
Arvanitis, 2008). The KOF survey is a voluntary mail survey with response rates for the covered 
manufacturing firms as follows: 33.5% (1996), 33.7% (1999), 44.6% (2002) and 38.7% (2005). 
Our final data, restricted to the manufacturing industry, omitting all firm-years with missing 
values, firms with less than 5 employees and firms with more than 50% of their activity spent in 
R&D, is an unbalanced panel of 2,653 firm-years (680, 633, 890, 450 for the years 1996, 1999, 
2002, 2005 respectively) for 1,744 firms distributed over the four periods, and may be 
considered as representative of Swiss manufacturing industry3. 
 
                                                     
3 In the paper, we do not use imputed values for the different variables and the number of firm-years available is thus 
reduced. The final sample is unbalanced: out of the 1,744 firms, 1082 were present during one period, 453 during two 
periods, 165 during three periods and only 41 during all four periods. 
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We now propose an empirical model which will serve as a guideline to compare the results 
obtained with two of the different possible solutions proposed in the literature and outlined 
above. 
 
 
4 Econometric modeling 
 
In order to evaluate the differences between the usual solutions and that facilitated by the Swiss 
data, we propose using an integrative framework developed by Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse 
(1989) (CDM thereafter). The full CDM model includes the following three relationships and 
interactions: innovation input to its determinants; innovation output to its inputs; productivity 
explained by innovation. Only the first two relationships are considered in the present paper, 
using covariates comparable to Griffith et al.’s (2006). 
This paper proposes an original extension of the cross sectional CDM model into a four period 
panel data (1993-1995, 1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004). This extension is however difficult 
for the first equation exploring the likelihood of being R&D active, since two thirds of firms are 
stable R&D investors or non R&D investors and so the interest in using a panel probit model 
with fixed effects (FE hereafter) is greatly reduced. In order to overcome this difficulty, we 
propose estimating a sample selection model with random effects (RE) as follows:  
 
*
1 1 1 it 1i 1i t
<0
*
2 2 2 it 2i 2it
0
& = ' ' 'w + (1)
& = ' ' ' x + (2)
it it
it it
R DYES COMPETITOR s u
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κ χ δ ε
κ χ β ε
<
⎧ + + +⎪⎨ + + +⎪⎩
 
 
where R&DYES is the observed binary variable equal to 0 for non-R&D firms and 1 for firms 
reporting enough positive internal R&D, and where a negative coefficient is expected for the 
COMPETITOR variable (κ1<0 in subscript). s is the matrix for other external sources of 
knowledge. w is a matrix for other variables including APPROPRIATION where a positive sign 
is expected4. Appropriation controls for the ability of firms to control outgoing spillovers and is 
thus the second face of the issue of incoming knowledge which we are focusing on. Other 
variables are control variables such as size, perceived number of competitors, type of 
competition, technological potential and anticipated demand explaining R&D decisions. χ1 and 
δ are vectors of parameters of interest to be estimated, u1 a firm specific random term and ε1 an 
error term.  
 
Conditional on firm i reporting systematic R&D, the declared intensity R&DI of the latent 
variable R&DI* is then observed and explained when R&DYES is 1. In the R&D intensity 
equation, if the disincentive effect prevails over the absorptive capacity effect, the coefficient of 
COMPETITOR is also expected to be negative (κ2<0). s2 and x are matrixes of variables 
explaining R&D intensity. s2 is defined as above; compared with w, the x matrix includes an 
additional variable: an R&D cooperation dummy (R&D COOP). The introduction of this latter 
is carried out in order to control for the differences between internalized and non-internalized 
incoming spillovers (See Belderbos et al. 2004 on this problem). χ2 and β are vectors of 
                                                     
4 The PUBLIC FUNDING variable has been included in KOF questionnaires only since the 1999 version. In order to 
keep our four periods instead of only three, we do not introduce the variable which is endogenous and in any case 
concerns very few companies in Switzerland. 
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parameters of interest to be estimated. u2 is a firm specific random term and ε2 an error term. 
The same four periods are considered5. 
 
The innovation stage is usually modeled as follows in CDM models: 
 
* PRED
it 3 3 3 it it 3i 3it
0
INNO  = ' ' 'R&DI + 'z +  itCOMPETITOR s uκ χ γ μ ε
<
+ + +  (3) 
 
where INNOit are the different possible knowledge outputs, influenced by R&D intensity. The 
integration of the model usually relies on the introduction in equation (3) of the linear predicted 
value of R&DI, R&DIPRED, instead of the observed R&DI in order to take the endogeneity of 
R&DI into account. R&D cooperation and knowledge from universities are considered here as 
instruments.  
 
Controlling for endogeneity in panel data with non-linear variables is however very difficult. In 
order to overcome this problem we propose modifying the standard equation (3), replacing the 
R&DI variable with the R&DYES variable. Doing this, we define a bivariate model with 
recursivity and random effects (See Sickles and Taubman (1986), Geoffard and Lamiraud 
(2007) for previous use). The bivariate model with random effects is then:  
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where the variables in the R&DYES equation are the same as for equation (1) above. In the 
second equation, a dominant deterring effect from incoming rivals’ knowledge should lead to a 
negative effect on innovation output (κ3<0). Similar to Griffith et al. (2006), innovation output 
is also determined by knowledge spillovers (s3) coming from suppliers, customers and parent 
firms, as well as by other determinants of knowledge production, z. χ3, γ and μ are parameters 
of interest, u3 is a firm specific random term, ε3 an error term and t the four periods considered.  
In such a recursive bivariate model, the endogeneity of a dichotomic variable can be controlled 
for. Product innovation (PRODUCT) and process innovation (PROCESS) are thus preferred as 
innovation output variables (INNO). In the bivariate models, the endogeneity of R&DYES is 
taken into account using the variable on academic knowledge sourcing as an instrument. 
 
Using this framework, we first present the “true” model for all Swiss firms, both innovative and 
non-innovative, which use incoming knowledge spillovers. Using Griffith et al.’s (2006) 
interesting idea, a second set of specifications then proposes to introduce censored regressors, 
considering that external knowledge is not important to non-innovative firms. In a formal way, 
the censoreditCOMPETITOR  variable is, as for the other external source variables, defined as 
censored
it it itCOMPETITOR = INNO .COMPETITOR  where INNO is a dummy set to 0 when 
the firm declares itself as non-innovative. The censored variables are thus introduced in place of 
                                                     
5 Note that a Simple Tobit model with fixed effects can be implemented for equation (2). The use of a fixed effect 
Tobit model for panel data is however a problem because of the restricted number of periods (See Greene, 2006). The 
simple Tobit results with RE or FE are available upon request.  
9 
uncensored variables in equations (2) and (3). Finally, a third set of regressions implements 
equations (1) and (2) specifically for innovative firms6 only. 
 
 
5 Results 
 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. In our sample, around 78% of firm-years are 
innovative and 58% of these declare some kind of positive R&D profile. 26% of innovative 
firms cooperate with other firms in R&D. Unsurprisingly, non-innovative firms are smaller than 
innovative ones and these perceive fewer competitors than the former. They also declare more 
often that they compete on non-price basis (46% vs 27%). More interesting is the importance of 
incoming spillovers for non-innovative firms who benefit to a great extent from external 
knowledge but in a less systematic way, especially in terms of knowledge coming from parent 
firms, clients, universities or consultants. Non-innovating firms depend more on their 
competitors (41%) or suppliers (29%) to maintain their technological capacities than innovative 
firms (33% and 22% respectively) or even firms carrying out R&D (34% and 21% 
respectively).  
 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
As Table 3 reports, the level of R&D investment is not significantly influenced by external 
knowledge: firms increase their R&D investment in order to capture academic knowledge and 
decrease such investment when they benefit from their own business group knowledge. The 
results on R&D intensity are robust whatever the specification chosen (compare [2a], [2b] and 
[2c]). However, the important role of competitors is unveiled when rivals’ knowledge is 
introduced into equation [1]. As column [1a] reveals, when a firm benefits from its rivals’ 
knowledge, the likelihood of it investing in R&D diminishes. This result is new, as existing 
literature usually introduces external knowledge only in the R&D intensity equation (see [1b]) 
or limits the investigation to innovative firms (see [1c]).  
 
A similar conclusion is reached for knowledge coming from suppliers: the disincentive effect is 
in fact much stronger than a CIS based study would suggest. Our results confirm the positive 
role of customers’ knowledge on R&D decisions (Column [1a] or column [2a]). Similarly, the 
existence of a dominant absorptive capacity effect is preserved with respect to the role of 
universities as sources of knowledge (Column [1a] to [2c]).  
 
The results confirm that standard studies based on direct measure of incoming knowledge 
understate the importance of the disincentive effect of intra-sectoral spillovers on R&D. Missing 
the fact that rivals’ ideas provide the opportunity to NOT invest in R&D, scholars overestimate 
the absorptive capacity effect, which may be important only for firms investing in R&D. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
                                                     
6A correction for selectivity à la Lööf and Heshmati (2002) in equation (3) is not easy in panel data framework where 
the endogeneity of R&D is a priority problem to deal with. This third solution we outlined in section 2 is thus not 
implemented in the present paper. 
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This disincentive effect of rivals’ knowledge is also found to be usually understated as the 
results on innovation output equation [3] show (See Table 4). The results obtained with 
uncensored variables describe a disincentive effect of rivals’ knowledge on the likelihood of 
being product innovative [3a] whereas the coefficient is not found to be significant for process 
innovation [3b]. As columns [3c] and [3d] report, the use of censored regressors à la Griffith et 
al. (2006) provides a very different result revealing positive coefficients synonym of an upward 
biased on external knowledge coefficients. Incoming intra-industry spillovers are thus shown to 
be more detrimental in our study than in standard ones. This result is in line with the foregoing 
results we obtained for R&D: intra-industry incoming spillovers deter R&D activity and, 
consequently, reduce innovative outputs. It also suggests that non-innovating firms are capable 
of tapping knowledge from other firms to a greater extent than one would have expected from 
current absorptive capacity literature. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The different results support our hypothesis that questionnaires focusing solely on innovative 
firms induce significant difficulties for scholars when trying to identify the real effect of 
spillovers. Moreover, they especially undervalue the disincentive impact of competitors’ 
knowledge on R&D decisions and innovation outcomes. The present paper also confirms some 
other hypotheses usually found in the literature.  
For instance, R&D co-operation is found to positively influence R&D intensity [2a]. Large 
firms are more likely to be involved in R&D activities [1a] or to be R&D intensive [1b]7 than 
SMEs. As expected, larger firms and firms with R&D activities are also more likely to be 
product or process innovators (see [3a], [3b]). 
Appropriation is found to be, as expected, positively related to the decision to invest in R&D 
(See Table 3, [1a]). However this positive effect vanishes for R&D intensity ([2a]). The 
capacity of appropriation is also positively linked to process innovation [3b] but surprisingly not 
for product innovation, as described in column [3a] of Table 4. One interpretation for this is that 
many non-innovators are laggards for whom it is easier to efficiently protect their know-how. 
These firms subsequently declare that they are able to protect their advantage whereas the same 
task is considered to be harder by innovators and especially technological leaders. 
The perceived number of competitors is found to deter firms from being R&D intensive ([2a]). 
This result is in line with the traditional idea that firms which monopolize power within their 
market niche are more likely to get returns from their R&D investments. The larger the number 
of competitors, the higher the likelihood to innovate in processes ([3b]. The impact of 
competition on product innovation is however unclear (see [3a]). 
Although non-price competition encourages firms to invest in R&D ([1a]), it does not 
significantly foster innovation (Table 4). Firms which believe that their industry has important 
technology opportunities are more likely to invest in R&D or to be R&D intense. A growing 
anticipated demand is also found to be a significant determinant for R&D investment. 
Technological opportunities and anticipated demand are however found to be weaker 
determinants of innovation. The lack of results regarding this point may be due to the time lag, 
as the considered innovations were introduced over the last three years of the study while the 
two explanatory variables were oriented towards future technology or demand. 
 
 
                                                     
7 The U shaped curve reaches a minimum for 150 employees. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The Swiss innovation questionnaires include an original measurement of the impact of incoming 
knowledge on a firm’s innovation capacities: the measure is performed on innovating and non-
innovative firms. The resulting data facilitates the identification of the “true” impact of 
incoming knowledge and especially of competitors’ ideas on R&D decisions and innovation 
output. It also enables us to compare these results with those usually produced with a standard 
innovation questionnaire. In this respect, we argue that the standard innovation questionnaire 
focusing on innovative firms introduces a systematic upward bias when the impact of external 
knowledge on R&D or innovation is considered. More specifically, we argue that studies, based 
on CIS questionnaires or based only on firms with R&D, either fail to show the importance of 
the disincentive effect regarding the decision to invest in R&D or overestimate the impact of 
rivals' knowledge on innovative activities.  
The empirical results confirm our hypothesis. Unlike results which can be obtained using a 
common CIS questionnaire, intra-industry spillovers dissuade firms from engaging in R&D 
activities. Finally, rivals’ knowledge is not found to be positively linked to the introduction of 
product or process innovation. These results contradict the general belief that disincentive 
effects of incoming spillovers are usually dominated by counterbalancing learning effects large 
enough to create strategic complementarities among competitors. 
 
Our results do not imply that the absorption theory does not hold anymore. They suggest that 
the standard absorptive capacity effect is more important for those firms carrying out R&D or 
who are technological leaders. These same firms disclose knowledge thereby dissuading R&D 
investment for non-R&D investors and technological laggards. At the same time, many lagging 
firms are unlikely to get positive returns from their R&D investments and are more likely to 
survive relying on external sources such as competitors or suppliers8. 
The empirical results reinvigorate the idea that intra-industry spillovers act as a critical 
determinant of technological strategies. They support theoretical considerations which insist on 
the importance of active imitation strategies among learning competitors with asymmetric 
spillovers (Nelson and Winter 1982; Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2002; Vandekerckhove and De 
Bondt 2007) where laggards or firms without R&D learn more from other firms, especially from 
competitors closer to cutting-edge technological development. 
 
To conclude, the present paper underlines the limitations of the CIS questionnaire and 
illustrates, through the KOF questionnaire, its possible extension toward non-innovators on 
questions pertaining to knowledge sourcing. The differences found between R&D active and 
non-active firms also argue for a direct measurement of technology positions among 
competitive firms. Questionnaires could first try to tackle this difficult issue through a 
characterization of the imitation strategies used by firms. Our opinion is that the usual question 
asked in innovation questionnaires, distinguishing between an innovation “new to the firm” but 
“not new to the market”, may identify followers but fail to identify imitators. Certain firms can 
consider themselves as non- innovating because they do not judge their imitation strategy as an 
innovative strategy. The two changes in questionnaires would facilitate the testing of theoretical 
models with asymmetric spillovers more precisely and would alleviate a major impediment in 
the understanding of patterns of industrial evolution. 
 
                                                     
8 The present paper does not explain however how non-innovative firms or non-R&D firms are able to capture 
external knowledge. The hypothesis that R&D is a latent variable is an appealing but oversimplified explanation for 
the existence of a non-R&D based absorptive capacity. 
12 
 
 
 
References 
 
Arvanitis S (2008) Innovation and labour Productivity in the Swiss Manufacturing Sector: An Analysis 
on Firms Panel Data. In: Van Beers C, Kleinknecht A, Ortt R, Verburg R (ed) Determinants of 
Innovative Behaviour: A Firm's Internal Practices and its External Environment. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Bernstein JI, Nadiri MI (1989) Research and Development and Intra-industry Spillovers: An Empirical 
Application of Dynamic Duality. Rev. of Econ. Stud. 56(2): 249-269. 
Belderbos R, Carree M, Lokshin B (2004) Cooperative R&D and firm performance. Res. Policy 33(10): 
1477-1492. 
Bloom N, Schankerman M, and Van Reenen J (2007) Identifying technology spillovers and product 
market rivalry. NBER Working Paper No 13060. 
Cassiman B, Veugelers R (2006) In Search of Complementarity in Innovation Strategy: Internal R&D, 
Cooperation in R&D and External Technology Acquisition. Manag. Sci. 52(1): 68-82. 
Cohen W, Levinthal D, (1989) Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D. The Econ. J. 99(397): 
569-596. 
Crépon B, Duguet E, and Mairesse J (1998) Research and Development, Innovation and Productivity: An 
Econometric Analysis at the Firm Level. Econ. of Inno. and New Technol. 7(2): 115–58. 
Crespi G, Criscuolo C, Haskel JE, Slaughter M (2008) Productivity Growth, Knowledge Flows, and 
Spillovers. NBER Working Papers 13959. 
Eeckhout J, Jovanovic B (2002) Knowledge Spillovers and Inequality. Am. Economic Rev. 92(5): 1290-
1307. 
Greene W (2006) Censored data and truncated distributions. In: Mills T, Patterson K (ed) Palgrave 
Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 1: Theoretical Econometrics. Palgrave-Macmillan, London, pp 
695–736. 
Griffith R, Huergo E, Mairesse J and Peters B (2006) Innovation and Productivity Across Four European 
Countries. Oxf. Rev. of Econ. Policy 22(4): 483-498. 
Jaffe A (1986) Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D. Am. Econ. Rev. 76: 984-1001. 
Lamiraud K, Geoffard PY (2007) Therapeutic non-adherence: a rational behavior revealing patient 
preferences? Health Econ. 16(11): 1185-1204. 
Levin RC, Klevorick AK, Nelson RR, Winter SG (1987) Appropriating the Returns from Industrial 
Research and Development. Brookings Pap. on Econ. Act., Economic Studies Program, The 
Brookings Institution 18(3): 783-832. 
Levin RC (1988) Appropriability, R&D spending, and Technological performance. Am. Econ. Rev. 78(2): 
424-428. 
Link AL, Neufeld JL (1986) Innovation versus imitation: investigating alternative R&D strategies. Appl. 
Econ. 18(12): 1359-1363. 
Lööf H, Heshmati A (2002) Knowledge capital and performance heterogeneity: A firm-level innovation 
study. Int. J. of Prod. Econ. 76(1): 61-85. 
Nelson R, Winter S (1982) An evolutionary theory of economic change. Belknap Press, Cambridge. 
OECD, (1992) Oslo Manual: Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data, 1st Edition. 
OECD, Paris.  
Raffo J, Lhuillery S, Miotti L (2008) Northern and southern innovativity: a comparison across European 
and Latin American countries, Eur. J. Dev. Res. 20(2): 219-239. 
Rigobon R, Stoker T (2007) Estimation with censored regressors: basic issues, Special issue in Honor of 
Daniel Mc Fadden. Int. Econ. Rev. 48 (4): 1441–1467. 
Sickles RC, Taubman P (1986) An analysis of the health and retirement status of the elderly. Econ. 54(6): 
1339 - 1356.  
Spence M (1984) Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance. Econ. 52(1): 101-21. 
Vandekerckhove J, De Bondt R (2008) Asymmetric spillovers and investments in research and 
development of leaders and followers. Econ. of Inno. and New Technol. 17(5): 417–433. 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 : Description of variables 
Variable name Definition 
Dependent variables  
   R&DYES Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the enterprise reports engagement in 
intramural R&D and a positive R&D budget. 
   R&DI Research and development investment / sales for the last year of the three year period 
(plus the minimum of the positive value of the ratio and then taken in logarithm) 
   PRODUCT Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm reports having introduced at least 
one new or technologically significantly improved product (new to the market or only 
new to the firm) during the three year period. 
   PROCESS Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm reports having introduced at least 
one new or technologically significantly improved production process during the three 
year period. 
Explanatory variables  
   PARENT Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if knowledge from parent firms was important or of great importance during the three year period  
   CUSTOMER Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if knowledge from customers or clients was important or of great importance during the three year period 
   COMPETITOR 
Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if knowledge from competitors and other firms 
from the same industry was important or of great importance during the three year 
period 
   SUPPLIER Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if knowledge from suppliers was important or of great importance during the three year period 
   UNIVERSITY Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if knowledge from universities or colleges was important or of great importance during the three year period 
   CONSULTANT Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if knowledge from consultancy firms or 
technological transfer firms was important or of great importance during the three year 
period 
   R&D COOP Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm had some cooperative arrangements 
for their R&D activities during the three year period 
   APPROPRIATION Dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the competitive advantages due to 
product or process  innovations are declared to be protected in to a large of very large 
extent by IPR or non-IPR strategies (e.g. patents, trademarks trade, copyright, secrecy, 
advantage time, product or process complexity, long-term employment of specialized 
personnel, etc.) during the three year period.  
   Size Logarithm of the number of employees for the last year of the three year period. 
   Price competition Dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the intensity of price competition is 
considered as strong or very strong.  
   Non Price competition Dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the intensity of non-price competition is 
considered as strong or very strong.  
   Perceived number of competitors  Dummies for four different market types: more than 50 competitors in the (worldwide) 
product market; 16 to 50 competitors; 11 to 15 competitors; 6 to 10 competitors; 
(reference group: up to 5 competitors) 
   Demand Demand expectations over the next three years 
   Technology Potential The technological potential of the firm industry 
   INDUS Set of 14 industry dummies according to the firm’s main business activity (2 digit level 
of NACE) 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
Population             All                      INNO=0              INNO=1             R&DYES=0           R&DYES=1     
N  890 256 634 117  517 
Variable  Mean Std. Mean  Mean Std. Mean Std.  Mean Std. 
R&DYES°  0.58 0.49   0.82 0.39    1.00 0.00 
R&DI  3.02 2.80   4.24 2.42    5.20 1.49 
Product Innovation°  0.65 0.48   0.91 0.28 0.71 0.46  0.96 0.20 
Process Innovation°  0.54 0.50   0.76 0.43 0.69 0.46  0.77 0.42 
Business group°  0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.24 0.43 0.16 0.37  0.26 0.44 
Clients°  0.56 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.47 0.50  0.59 0.49 
Competitors°  0.36 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46  0.34 0.47 
Suppliers°  0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43  0.21 0.41 
Universities°  0.21 0.40 0.16 0.36 0.23 0.42 0.10 0.30  0.25 0.44 
Consultants °  0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18  0.06 0.23 
Business group censored  0.17 0.38 0 0 0.24 0.43 0.16 0.37  0.26 0.44 
Clients Censored°  0.41 0.49 0 0 0.57 0.50 0.47 0.50  0.59 0.49 
Competitors Censored°  0.24 0.43 0 0 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46  0.34 0.47 
Suppliers Censored°  0.16 0.36 0 0 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43  0.21 0.41 
Universities Censored°  0.16 0.37 0 0 0.23 0.42 0.10 0.30  0.25 0.44 
Consultants Censored°  0.04 0.19 0 0 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18  0.06 0.23 
R&D cooperation°  0.19 0.39   0.26 0.44 0.02 0.13  0.32 0.47 
Appropriation efficiency°  0.11 0.31 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.33 0.03 0.16  0.15 0.35 
Size  4.11 1.32 3.62 1.15 4.32 1.33 3.81 1.25  4.43 1.32 
Price competition°  0.75 0.44 0.77 0.42 0.74 0.44 0.74 0.44  0.74 0.44 
Non-price competition°  0.41 0.49 0.27 0.45 0.46 0.50 0.36 0.48  0.48 0.50 
No. of competitors (more than 50)°  0.17 0.37 0.21 0.41 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.43  0.13 0.33 
No. of competitors (16 to 50)°  0.12 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34  0.11 0.32 
No. of competitors (11 to 15)°  0.46 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.43 0.50  0.49 0.50 
No. of competitors (1 to 10)°  0.25 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.20 0.40  0.27 0.44 
Technological opportunities°  0.32 0.47 0.21 0.41 0.37 0.48 0.22 0.42  0.40 0.49 
Demand anticipated°  0.32 0.47 0.24 0.43 0.35 0.48 0.25 0.43  0.38 0.48 
° Dummy variable.  The period considered here is 1999-2001.  
The table is similar to the one obtained for other periods (available upon request). 
The R&D COOP variable is also considered as null for non-innovators, in order to compute 
the mean of the complete sample.  
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Table 3: Innovation inputs 
Column [Equation - model] [1a] [2a] [1b] [2b] [1c] [2c] 
Model Heckman Heckman Heckman 
Firms All All INNO=1 
Ext. source regressors Uncensored Uncensored No Uncensored Uncensored Uncensored
Explained Variable R&DYES R&DI R&DYES R&DI R&DYES R&DI 
Competitors°  -0,257*** -0,001  -0,013 0,048 -0,005 
  (0,073) (0,060)  (0,060) (0,098) (0,062) 
Clients°  0,183*** 0,102*  0,107* 0,016 0,096 
  (0,068) (0,059)  (0,058) (0,092) (0,061) 
Suppliers°  -0,137* -0,053  -0,053 -0,062 -0,098 
  (0,080) (0,066)  (0,066) (0,108) (0,070) 
Universities and Colleges °  0,278*** 0,248***  0,277*** 0,425*** 0,254*** 
  (0,093) (0,066)  (0,066) (0,136) (0,072) 
Consultants °  -0,047 -0,055  -0,041 0,113 -0,026 
  (0,140) (0,099)  (0,099) (0,195) (0,103) 
Business group°  0,025 -0,135**  -0,139** 0,084 -0,125* 
  (0,086) (0,064)  (0,065) (0,117) (0,067) 
R&D cooperation°   0,214***  0,215***  0,226*** 
   (0,056)  (0,056)  (0,058) 
Appropriation efficiency°  0,328*** 0,078 0,319*** 0,073 0,540*** 0,092 
  (0,101) (0,071) (0,097) (0,071) (0,142) (0,075) 
Size  0,418*** -0,501*** 0,413*** -0,501*** 0,222*** -0,447*** 
  (0,029) (0,097) (0,028) (0,096) (0,036) (0,101) 
Size squared   0,047***  0,046***  0,042*** 
   (0,010)  (0,010)  (0,010) 
Price competition°  0,025 -0,023 0,016 -0,023 -0,021 -0,039 
  (0,081) (0,064) (0,079) (0,065) (0,106) (0,066) 
Non-price competition°  0,220*** 0,022 0,215*** 0,011 0,087 0,032 
  (0,070) (0,056) (0,069) (0,056) (0,092) (0,059) 
No. of competitors (16 to 50)°  -0,132 0,191** -0,136 0,214** -0,074 0,206** 
  (0,123) (0,097) (0,121) (0,097) (0,152) (0,104) 
No. of competitors (11 to 15)°  0,050 0,136** 0,054 0,147** 0,094 0,155** 
  (0,088) (0,071) (0,086) (0,071) (0,109) (0,075) 
No. of competitors (1 to 10)°  0,118 0,221*** 0,129 0,226*** 0,284** 0,238*** 
  (0,109) (0,084) (0,106) (0,084) (0,142) (0,088) 
Techno. Potential°  0,469*** 0,128** 0,482*** 0,127** 0,230** 0,138** 
  (0,078) (0,059) (0,075) (0,060) (0,101) (0,063) 
Demand°  0,423*** 0,134** 0,421*** 0,135** 0,256*** 0,145** 
  (0,073) (0,058) (0,072) (0,058) (0,094) (0,060) 
Log-Likelihood  -4378.4 -4389.5 -3762.2 
Firm-Years  2653 2653 2103 
Uncensored Firm-Years?  1826 1826 1826 
Firms  1744 1744 1420 
The periods considered are 1993-1995, 1996-1998, 1999-2001 and 2002-2004. 
* Significant at 10%,  ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  ° Dummy variable.  
All models are random effects. 
Marginal effects and industry dummies are not reported. 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 : Innovation outputs 
Column [Equation - model]   [3a] [3b]  [3c] [3d] 
Firms  All All  All All 
Ext. source regressors  Uncensored Uncensored  Censored Censored 
Explained Variable  PRODUCT PROCESS  PRODUCT PROCESS 
Competitors°  -0.151* -0.021  0.228*** 0.338*** 
  (0.085) (0.069) (0.090) (0.075) 
Clients°  0.073 0.092  0.658*** 0.504*** 
  (0.080) (0.063) (0.086) (0.068) 
Suppliers°  -0.042 0.174**  0.315*** 0.676*** 
  (0.089) (0.083) (0.094) (0.093) 
Business group°  -0.061 -0.103  0.354*** 0.092 
  (0.102) (0.078) (0.108) (0.083) 
Appropriation efficiency°  -0.085 0.212**  -0.120 0.202* 
  (0.122) (0.101) (0.127) (0.107) 
R&DYES°  3.043*** 1.834***  2.837*** 1.593*** 
  (0.104) (0.110) (0.101) (0.116) 
Size  0.087** 0.143***  0.030 0.113*** 
  (0.034) (0.026) (0.034) (0.027) 
Price competition°  -0.149* 0.084  -0.198** 0.043 
  (0.089) (0.074) (0.092) (0.077) 
Non-price competition°  0.105 0.063  0.025 -0.001 
  (0.078) (0.064) (0.078) (0.066) 
No. of competitors (16 to 50)°  0.277** 0.067  0.274** 0.050 
  (0.131) (0.115) (0.129) (0.121) 
No. of competitors (11 to 15)°  0.142 -0.243***  0.141 -0.279*** 
  (0.098) (0.082) (0.097) (0.087) 
No. of competitors (1 to 10)°  0.265** -0.179*  0.250** -0.214** 
  (0.122) (0.100) (0.127) (0.105) 
Techno. Potential°  0.097 0.132*  -0.010 0.045 
  (0.085) (0.068) (0.088) (0.071) 
Demand°  -0.163* 0.141**  -0.179** 0.137** 
  (0.083) (0.067) (0.083) (0.067) 
Log-Likelihood  -2231.864 -2698.28 -2180.64 -2631.03 
H0: Instrument Coeff=0  3.124*** 3.451*** 2.718*** 3.124*** 
The periods considered are 1993-1995, 1996-1998, 1999-2001 and 2002-2004.   
For the complete sample: 2653 firm-years for 1744 firms.  
° Dummy variable. * Significant at 10%,  ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
The four bivariate models are random effects. Equation (1), marginal effects, industry dummies are not reported. 
University knowledge is used as an instrument in [3a] and [3b].  
The censored university variable is used as an instrument in [3c] and [3d]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
